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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
This matter is before the Court on the state’s appeal from the district court’s decision
finding the magistrate court abused its discretion when precluding admission of a transcript of an
Administrative License Suspension (ALS) hearing at trial and precluding certain testimony by
Chavez regarding the appearance of a witness at that ALS hearing.
Factual And Procedural History
During the evening of January 1 and early morning of January 2, 2015, Gustavo Chavez,
2nd, attended a gathering at a friend’s house. (Tr., p.108, L.1 – p.109, L.2.) Although he had not
planned on drinking that night, Chavez ended up consuming alcohol. (Tr., p.109, Ll.3-10.) Chavez
decided it was time to leave. (Tr., 110, Ll.4-10.). Chavez found someone willing to drive him and
his truck home. (Tr., p.110, L.22 – p.111, L.10.) That person was Jesus Blancas. (Tr., p.111,
L.6.) Prior to leaving the gathering, Chavez called his wife and made arrangements to have his
wife drive Blancas back to the gathering. (Tr., p.110, Ll.11-21.)
Before making it to Chavez’s house, Blancas and Chavez ran out of gas. (Tr., p.111, Ll.1118.) As they were attempting to get the truck started again, the truck started sliding off to the side
of the road and would not start again. (Tr., p.111, Ll.11-18.) Being within walking distance of
the gathering, Blancas decided to walk back. (Tr., p.111, L.24 – p.112, L.11.) However, as Chavez
was not dressed for the weather and did not want to abandon his truck, Chavez walked to the
closest house and knocked on the door. (Tr., p.112, L.10 – p.113, L.2.)
The house happened to belong to Bureau of Land Management Ranger Jeffrey Long. (Tr.,
p.113, Ll.5-6.) Chavez asked to use the phone, and Long invited Chavez inside. (Tr., p.113, Ll.1121.)

Suspecting that Chavez had been driving under the influence, Long contacted law
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enforcement. (Tr., p.30, L.21 – p.31, L.6.) After an investigation, Chavez was charged with
Driving Under the Influence. I.C. § 18-8004.
Just prior to the jury trial in this matter, the magistrate court granted a motion in limine
filed by the state ruling that Chavez would not be allowed to admit the transcript of his ALS
hearing. (Tr., p.13, Ll.3-14.) The magistrate court also precluded Chavez from offering any
evidence that an ALS hearing occurred and that Jesus Blancas appeared in person at that hearing.
(Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.20.) Chavez was convicted.
Chavez appealed to the district court. (R., pp.93-97.) The district court reversed the trial
court and remanded the case holding that (1) the magistrate failed to apply the correct legal
standard when ruling on the admissibility of the ALS hearing transcript and the case needed to be
remanded for the trial court to make the necessary factual findings, and (2) the trial court abused
its discretion by precluding Chavez from testifying that Blancas appeared at the ALS hearing. (R.
pp. 118-31.)
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ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err in remanding the case for the magistrate court to apply the proper
legal analysis and make the appropriate factual findings in regard to the admissibility of the ALS
hearing transcript?
2.
Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate court’s decision precluding Chavez
from testifying that Blancas appeared at the ALS hearing?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In Ruling
On The Admissibility of the ALS Hearing Transcript.
A.

Introduction
At trial, Chavez sought to introduce a transcript of the sworn testimony of Jesus Blancas

given at Chavez’s ALS hearing. (Tr., pp.10-13.) The magistrate court excluded the ALS transcript
as hearsay. (Tr., p.13, Ll.3-14.) On intermediate appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate
court.

The district court found that the magistrate abused its discretion in ruling on the

admissibility of the ALS transcript for failing to apply the correct legal standard and for failing to
make the necessary factual findings. (R., pp.124-127.)
B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity, the reviewing

court directly reviews the district court’s decision. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d
758 (2008).
“Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine so we review the
[trial] court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.” Cramer v.
Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 878, 204 P.3d 508, 518 (2009) (quoting Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161,
167, 158 P.3d 937, 943 (2007)). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the
issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable
legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason.” State v. Guess, 154
Idaho 521, 528, 300 P.3d 53, 60 (2013) (quoting Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196
P.3d 341, 347 (2008)).
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C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion
In Excluding The ALS Transcript Because The Magistrate Court Applied An Incorrect
Legal Standard And Failed To Make The Factual Findings Necessary To Determine
Admissibility Of The ALS Transcript
The district court’s decision should be upheld because the magistrate court applied an

incorrect legal standard when deciding to exclude the ALS hearing transcript. Hearsay is generally
inadmissible. I.R.E. 802. However, Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) provides an exception to
the hearsay rule where a witness is unavailable at trial. It allows for the admission of former
testimony where: (1) the witness is unavailable; and (2) “the party against whom the testimony is
now offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination.” I.R.E. 804(b)(1).
At the hearing on the state’s Motion in Limine to preclude admission of the ALS hearing
transcript, the state conceded that Blancas was unavailable. (Tr., p.10, Ll.14-16.) Accordingly,
the issue for the magistrate to decide was whether the state “had an opportunity and similar motive
to develop [Blancas’s] testimony…” I.R.E. 804(b)(1). The magistrate granted the state’s Motion
in Limine stating:
The problem is there was no – it was – it was former testimony, it was made
under oath, and there was no cross-examination. Questions which may or may not
have been asked by the hearing officer are not cross-examination, and so for that
testimony to come in, there would have had to have been cross-examination. There
wasn’t here. And so I respectfully will grant the motion in limine and decline the
request to bring in the transcript from the ALS hearing.
(Tr., p.13, Ll. 6-14.) The magistrate erred in so ruling.
The magistrate misperceived the issue as whether cross-examination actually occurred
instead of whether the state (through the Idaho Transportation Department) had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop Blancas’s testimony. ALS hearings are held pursuant to Idaho Code §
18-8002A and are presided over by a “hearing officer” designated by the Idaho Transportation

5

Department. Hearing officers have “authority to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take
testimony, receive relevant evidence, issue subpoenas, regulate the course and conduct of the
hearing and make a final ruling on the issues before him.” I.C. § 18-8002A(1)(f) (emphasis added).
The issues to be decided at an ALS Hearing are whether:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 188004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 188006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance
with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment
was not functioning properly when the test was administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.
I.C. § 18-8002A(7).
Similarly, the issues to be determined at a trial for Driving Under the Influence are whether
the defendant drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway, street or
bridge or upon public or private property open to the public, while under the influence of a
combination of alcohol or drugs or an intoxicating substance or while having an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of the defendant’s blood. See. I.C.J.I. 1000.
Also, testimony regarding compliance with the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) would
be offered by the State in an attempt to lay the proper foundation for admission of test results.
Clearly, there is a union of issues at ALS hearings and DUI trials – essentially, was the
person in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. “Actual
physical control,” “motor vehicle,” “alcohol concentration,” and “highway, street or bridge or
upon public or private property open to the public” are all terms that are defined the same at both
6

ALS hearings and DUI trials. See I.C. §§18-8002A, 18-8004. The fact that ALS hearings are
aimed at deciding whether one’s driver’s license should be suspended and DUI trials are aimed at
deciding whether one is guilty of violating Idaho criminal DUI laws is of no consequence. The
same issues are addressed when determining those outcomes. Accordingly, the state had a similar
motive for examining Blancas at the ALS hearing as it would have had at the DUI trial had he been
available to testify.
The state’s argument that the state is not a party to ALS proceedings is incorrect. (It should
be noted that the state never asserted this argument below, and the magistrate court never addressed
this issue.)

Actually, the district court correctly concluded that the hearing officer was a

representative of the state in the same manner as a prosecutor in a criminal case. (R., pp.125-26.)
Article IV, Section 20, of the Idaho State Constitution clearly groups together “all executive and
administrative officers, agencies, and instrumentalities of the executive department of the state.”
Idaho Code section 40-501 established the Idaho Transportation Department, and clearly states
that that department “is an executive department of state government.” Finally, the director of the
Idaho Transportation Department is required to “enforce all provisions of the laws of the state
relating to the department.” I.C. §40-505.
Just as a prosecuting attorney is tasked with enforcing the law (I.C. § 31-2227), the
administrative hearing officer was appointed by the director of the Idaho Transportation
Department to enforce the laws of Idaho as they relate to ALS hearings. I.C. §40-505. The law
relating to ALS hearings is codified in Idaho’s criminal code. Accordingly, a representative of
the executive branch of government tasked with enforcing Idaho’s laws was present at the ALS
hearing and had the duty of addressing substantially the same issues that were present at Chavez’s
trial. As such, the “state” was a party to the ALS proceeding. At a minimum, the district court
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was correct in concluding that the magistrate applied the incorrect legal standard on this issue and
neglected to make necessary factual findings to correctly rule.
Finally, under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(1)(f), the hearing officer clearly had the right,
ability, and opportunity to question Blancas. The fact that the hearing officer chose not to is
irrelevant to the court’s decision whether the prior testimony provided under oath is admissible
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1). Nowhere in that rule does it require that crossexamination actually occurred or that the party actually exercised its ability to examine the witness.
Instead the rule simply requires a “similar motive” and “opportunity” to cross-examine. I.R.E.
804(b)(1). The magistrate cited no authority for the proposition that “Questions which may or
may not have been asked by the hearing officer are not cross-examination.”
The district court’s decision should be upheld because the magistrate applied an incorrect
legal standard and failed to make a proper determination of the correct issues regarding admission
of the ALS hearing transcript. The magistrate erred by failing to consider whether the state had a
“similar motive” and “opportunity” to cross-examine Blancas at the ALS hearing. The magistrate
made no such determination, instead simply asserted that “Questions which may or may not have
been asked by the hearing officer are not cross-examination.” Accordingly, the magistrate’s
determination was erroneous, and the decision of the district court should be upheld.
The magistrate’s error in precluding admission of the ALS hearing transcript was not
harmless error. “The test for harmless error ... is whether a reviewing court can find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the
challenged evidence.” State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998) (quoting
Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 925, 877 P.2d 365, 369 (1994)). In this matter, it is extremely likely
that the jury would have acquitted Chavez had it been allowed to receive and review the ALS
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hearing transcript of Blancas’s testimony that he was driving. Knowledge that the person whom
Chavez and his witnesses testified was driving actually testified to such under oath would have
convinced the jury that Chavez was not guilty of DUI.
The importance of the ALS Transcript is also made apparent by the state’s arguments in
closing and rebuttal regarding Blancas’s absence from trial. (Tr., p.153, Ll.15-16, p.163, Ll.4-10.)
Finally, the ALS transcript was so important in the minds of the jury that it actually sent the
magistrate a question asking to be provided with the testimony from Blancas. (Tr., p.165, Ll.2021.) That alone shows that the jury felt that Blancas’s testimony would have swayed them to
acquit Chavez.
II.
The District Court Correctly Ruled That The Magistrate Court Abused Its Discretion In
Precluding Admission Of Evidence That Jesus Blancas Appeared At Chavez’s ALS Hearing
A.

Introduction
In addition to erroneously excluding the admission of the ALS hearing transcript, the

magistrate court compounded that error by improperly precluding Chavez from offering any
evidence that Blancas personally appeared at the ALS hearing. (Tr., p.13, L.17 – p.15, L.20.) The
district court correctly ruled that the magistrate court abused its discretion by failing to conduct
the proper legal and factual analysis when it precluded such testimony. (R., pp.127-30.)
B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity, the reviewing

court directly reviews the district court’s decision. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d
758 (2008).
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C.

The Magistrate Court Erred In Precluding Chavez From Presenting Testimony That Jesus
Blancas Personally Appeared At Chavez’s Administrative License Suspension Hearing
The magistrate court should have allowed Chavez to offer testimony that Blancas appeared

and testified at Chavez’s ALS hearing. In response to the magistrate court ruling in favor of the
state regarding admission of the ALS hearing transcript, Chavez’s trial counsel inquired as to
whether he would be allowed to elicit testimony that an ALS hearing occurred and that Blancas
appeared and testified at that hearing. (Tr., p. 13, L. 15 – p. 15, L. 20.) The magistrate, without
any analysis, or even reference to evidentiary rules, held any such testimony was “not coming in.”
(Id.)
The district court correctly concluded that the magistrate court provided no legal basis for
its decision. The magistrate court failed to engage in any analysis under Idaho Rules of Evidence
401, 402, or 403. That failure, in and of itself, is a clear abuse of discretion.
Even if the magistrate court had engaged in the proper analysis, the decision to preclude
this evidence was erroneous. Chavez would have been testifying to his firsthand knowledge of the
fact that Blancas personally appeared and testified at the ALS hearing. Chavez witnessed that with
his own eyes.1 (Tr., p. 139, Ll.19-23, p. 141, Ll. 21-25.) The fact that Blancas appeared and
testified at Chavez’s ALS hearing is clearly relevant to Chavez’s defense – one key disputed issue
being, “Does Jesus Blancas exist?” It is also relevant to why Blancas was absent from the trial –
i.e., he’s “already been before, so he couldn’t do it again.” (Tr., p. 139, L. 22 – p. 140, L.9, p. 141
L. 21 – p. 142 L. 1.) Although neither the state nor magistrate court raised or considered any
rules of evidence below, the district court conducted such an analysis in its capacity as an appellate
court. The district court correctly concluded that Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 would
1 In

its brief, the state claims that all Chavez could testify to was “that on a certain date he heard
Blancas’s voice on a phone call.” (Brief of Appellant, p. 11.) The state misrepresents the record.
Chavez would have testified that he personally witnessed Blancas appear and testify.
10

all allow admission of the testimony in question. Any concerns regarding the factors under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 403 could have easily been cured by limiting the scope of the evidence and
providing a limiting instruction to the jury regarding what it could consider based upon that
evidence. For example, any concern that the jury would infer that Blancas testified that he was
driving could have been cured by a simple limiting instruction to the effect that the jury could only
consider testimony that Blancas appeared and testified at the ALS hearing for purposes of deciding
issues about his existence and absence from trial, not for purposes of speculating about what he
testified. Therefore, not only was the district court correct in concluding the magistrate court
abused its discretion by failing to apply the correct legal standard and make the required factual
findings, but was also correct in concluding that such testimony should have been admitted.
The magistrate court’s error in precluding this evidence was not harmless. As argued
above, the existence of Blancas and the issue of his absence from trial were key issues. Evidence
that Blancas appeared at Chavez’s ALS hearing would have corroborated Chavez’s defense and
provided an explanation for Blancas’s absence. Had the jury been able to hear and consider that
evidence, the outcome of the trial would have been different. That the exclusion of this evidence
was not harmless is made especially evident by the question asked by the jury during deliberations.
The jury asked if it “could be provided with Jesus’s testimony.” (Tr., p. 165, Ll. 20-21.) It cannot
be disputed that Blancas was in the forefront of the jurors’ minds. At trial, the state implicitly
conceded that testimony surrounding Blancas’s presence at Chavez’s ALS hearing was important.
The state made sure to point out to the jury that, despite Chavez’s assertion that he and Blancas
were good friends, “when it comes down to when [Chavez] really needs [Blancas],” Blancas was
“not here.” (Tr., p. 163, Ll.4-10.)
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In its brief, the state argues that testimony regarding Blancas’s personal appearance at the
ALS hearing would have been cumulative and would not have made a difference to the jury.
Clearly, that is not the case. The issue of who was driving was central to the trial. That the jury
was interested in this type of testimony is evidenced by the jury’s question. As discussed above,
the state addressed these very issues in closing arguments. The evidence that was improperly
excluded by the magistrate court very well could have swayed the jury in Chavez’s favor. As such,
the magistrate court’s errors were not harmless.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the district court and remand the matter for further
Dated this 5th day of May, 2017

proceedings.
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